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1. Introduction 
The works of French economist Jacques Rueff (1896-1978) are well known and their 
importance is widely acknowledged. As indicated by his preface to Robbins’s La grande 
dépression (1935), many famous economists of Rueff’s era respected his ideas, addressing for 
example his views on unemployment (Beveridge 1909, Hicks 1932, Keynes 1939, Pigou 
1920, 1927), money (Mundell 1973) or transfers (Keynes 1929a, b, c). More recent works on 
Rueff have focussed on the monetary aspects of his writings (Pays 1991, Chivvis 2010). 
However, the young Rueff (pre-1939) remains largely unknown, and the use he 
proposed for non-Euclidean geometry in political economy has been little studied (excepting 
Frobert 2010). This is due to the fact that Rueff is influenced by a Cartesian method inherited 
from geometry to the problem of unemployment in England (Rueff 1925, 1931), which 
caused controversy – generally speaking, all that is recalled about this episode is that he made 
some proposals which seemed rather cold-blooded compared with the human disaster of 
unemployment. Although Rueff is respected by his peers, the anomaly remains that he is a 
major French economist whose early epistemological writings are very little known (see, 
however, Claassen 1967). Moreover, his interest in geometrical methods is widely neglected. 
This article remedies this neglect by providing an overview of Rueff’s readings of geometry 
in political economy, and exploring its intellectual roots. 
Rueff is strongly influenced by a metaphor based upon non-Euclidean geometry. More 
exactly, he adopts a particular conception of reality: only the structure of reasoning counts, 
regardless of whether the result is observable or not. Here he makes reference to the scientific 
developments in non-Euclidean geometry achieved by Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), 
Bernhard Riemann (1826-1866), János Bolyai (1802-1860) and Nikolai Ivanovich 
Lobachevsky (1792-1856). Jacques Rueff is not the only economist to have drawn on this 
movement to bring new perspectives to the science; but we argue here that Rueff is the only 
one to have been strongly influenced by this field of knowledge in order to enlighten social 
issues. 
In this respect, the first part of this paper deals with the concept of unemployment. 
Here, Rueff provides a controversial analysis based upon the tools he designed, particularly 
the wage/price ratio. Indeed, the very way he constructed his notion of causality – based upon 
the difference between the level of unemployment and this famous ratio – was seen as 
controversial. Hence, a major consequence is that Rueff argues for a decrease in the 
wage/price ratio: here, then, stands a complex choice, decreasing wages while prices stay 
constant, or increasing prices while wages stay constant. 
The second part of this paper shed light of the intellectual root of this analysis and 
states that the tools designed by Rueff are based upon his interest in non-Euclidean geometry, 
a development in mathematics which indicated that our world could be apprehended from 
more than three dimensions. This intellectual movement remains the first step taken by 
several sciences towards a new conception of reality. We also show that Rueff considers 
reality to be inaccessible. In his view, we only can design tools which tend to approach this 
reality. Hence, our rational ego and our reasoning machine – in addition to our language – 
enable us to build knowledge in a way which leads us to understand our human condition. 
Rueff never places trust in our ability to find principles of causality: causes are only a human 
creation, a convention which helps us in our practice of science2.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In the French edition of 1922, Rueff uses the term of “principe de causalité” which Herman 
Green translates as “Law of Causality” (Rueff, 1929 [1922]). We choose to keep the term 
“principle of causality” except in quotations from this English edition. 
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2. Rueff’s analysis of British unemployment  
We analyse here Rueff’s work as related to unemployment, published as “Les variations du 
chômage en Angleterre” (1925), “Chômage et salaire réel en Angleterre dans la période 1919-
1925” (1926) and “L’assurance-chômage, cause du chômage permanent ” (1931a, 1931b).3 
These works contain the clearest presentation of his method. We separate our development 
into two key syllogistic aspects, as Rueff himself recommended: observation (4.1) and 
reasoning (4.2). 
 
2.1 The empirical branch: hypothesis and observations  
Rueff’s work starts from two simple observed facts: the almost exponential increase in 
unemployment in England between 1919 and 1920, and the parallelism between the 
unemployment curve and the wage/price ratio curve. Therefore, Rueff hypothesizes, changes 
in unemployment are linked to the difference between levels of wages and prices. More 
precisely, these changes in unemployment could be explained by changes in this difference 
and follow the same fluctuations. Before going further, we thus present the variables 
unemployment, price and wage:  
1. Unemployment is a rate established in relation with the unions: hence it does not 
strictly measure the number of individuals over 15 years of age who are without a job and 
who are searching for one, as it is defined today. Rather, this rate is the “percentage of 
workers unemployed in a number of trade unions compared with the total number of members 
of these unions” (1931a: 245). This percentage was commonly used at that time and doesn’t 
aspire to pose any particular concern as regards its design or in its use. Hence, “the published 
indices can’t give an idea of the absolute importance of unemployment, but enable us to 
follow the magnitude of its variations in satisfactory condition” (1925b: 426).  
2. Concerning wages, Rueff reasons with real wages, which are obtained by 
calculating the ratio between nominal wages and prices. For nominal wages, he uses an index 
created by Professor Arthur L. Bowley (1869-1957), a statistician and a major figure in the 
introduction of descriptive statistics in political economy (few works of his time use numbers 
other than his own). 
3. On prices, Rueff uses wholesale prices furnished by the Board of Trade: this is the 
monthly sum of the “price of a number of commodities and goods, chosen once and for all (45 
in the index of Statistique Générale de France)” (1923a: 101). Again, this variable is 
commonly used and seems difficult to criticize. 
The controversial element is the ratio itself. Indeed, Rueff has been criticized for using 
a real wage based upon wholesale prices: as Rueff argues, the goal is to analyse the “disparity 
between changes in wages and changes in selling prices, not the purchasing power of the 
worker […] without going into considerations of fairness or fair price” (1931c: 244). Hence, 
what really interests Rueff is the observation of the disparity between different variables. 
Rueff doesn’t see wages as purchasing power but as a cost of business returns, and so as a 
“cost of human labour per unit of output” (Ibid., 244). Rueff focuses clearly on the supply 
side and on changes in wages as a cost as well as the selling prices. This explains the choice 
of wholesale prices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See also the other works from Rueff on unemployment in which (with Georges Lane) he 
analyses English unemployment after the Second World War (from 1963 to 1975) and 
criticizes the Phillips’s curve (see their article, “La fin de l’ère keynésienne”, in Le Monde, 
February 19, 20 and 21th 1976). 
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According to Rueff, the index of wholesale prices remains the most able to establish 
observations in terms of the economic equilibrium of the goods market. In fact, “we see the 
price index increasing with the overall average of prices, and we can say that when this index 
increases, the purchasing power of the monetary unit, which is used to express these studied 
prices, decreases in the same proportion” (1923a: 101). Indeed, this is a conception of price as 
a factor of economic equilibrium. A price is adequate even though it remains high, simply 
because it has been freely determined. In this respect, wage acts as a variable of equilibrium 
on the labour market. Rueff notes, therefore, several elements that constitute the empirical 
branch of this work and which are the basis for his reasoning (see Table 1):  
 
It is precisely from the time when the index of wholesale prices decreases in England as 
unemployment rises, and it continues to increase as the wage index increases. Then the 
representing curve of this index is close to the prices curve, and unemployment begins to 
decrease, until the beginning of 1925 when it resumes its increase as the difference between 
the two curves grows again. (1925b: 427) 
 
The indexes of wages W and prices P (W/P as a real wage) both increase until the 
mid-1920s with the level of variation of the price index a third higher than the wage index, all 
with low unemployment. Then the prices index decreases more than wages. Moreover, the 
decrease of prices arises earlier compared to wages (mid-1920 against mid-1921) and the 
wage/price ratio increases sharply, as well as unemployment. Finally, the price index 
continues to decline, although it remains low, while the wage index stabilizes. Unemployment 
only decreases by some 8.8 points before resuming its rise, while the W/P ratio also arises 
again. The second quarter of 1920 sees unemployment reaching its minimum (1.1%) while 
the price index also reaches its maximum, where the wage is at its 5th highest value (after the 
next 4 quarters). This period of growth of these two variables is symbolized by a W/P ratio at 
a low level (the 3rd lowest value after the two previous quarters). Exactly one year later, the 
second quarter of 1922 is marked by one of the highest unemployment rates (20.9%). It is 
interesting to note that, over the period, the wage index reaches its second highest value (after 
the next quarter), while the price reaches its 18th highest value, giving rise to the maximum 
ratio wage/price (1.333).  
 
And this is easily explained. During a monetary depreciation, it is due to the constant rise in 
prices that the workers are demanding an increase in their wages, and they obtain it with an 
obvious but significant lateness. When, for example, the price level reported to base 100 for 
the year 1913 reaches its maximum, i.e. 324 (more than three times the pre-war level), the 
level of wages reported on the same basis never exceeds 250 (two and a half times the pre-war 
level). Here stands a general situation that seems characteristic of all periods of rising prices. 
(1925b: 435) 
 
The wage index begins to decline when unemployment reaches its maximum, while 
the price index begins to decrease when unemployment reaches its minimum, with 
unemployment ceasing to decrease from mid-1921 to mid-1924. This decrease in index 
continues – except for some minor variation – in the last two years when the wages decline, 
and where prices had already seen their rate of decline slowing significantly from 1922. This 
coincides with a rise in unemployment from mid-1924. Regarding the wage/price ratio, we 
note that it decreases while unemployment reaches its minimum. Then it increases along with 
it: this seems to be due to the increase in the wage index coupled with the decrease in prices 
until mid-1921, and then to a lesser decrease in the wage index related to prices until the 
beginning of 1922. Unemployment then fluctuates downward (-19.6%) from 1922 to 1923, 
and then increases (12.2%) from 1924 to 1925. This may be explained by the above 
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observations, namely a small rise in the wage index in 1924 accompanied by a slowdown in 
the rate of decrease of the price index starting at the beginning of 1922.  
Obviously these figures are not accurate and only approximately reflect general trends, 
but this does not prevent us seeing, for instance, the impact of the American crisis of 1920-
1921: this is in part due to lower discount rates (bank rate) in the United States, intended to 
absorb part of the debt. The result is a decrease in prices and in economic activity that 
inevitably affects the English markets. Hence, these figures do not teach us much in 
themselves, except in so far as they are indicative of an a priori link between the wage/price 
ratio and unemployment. It would be naive to hope for a return to a low unemployment rate 
with a level of the price index a third higher than wages, as it was the case until the middle of 
1920. 
With his tools defined and the variations discussed, Rueff then derives a possible link 
between changes in unemployment and in the ratio between wages and prices. He then 
constructs a curve for this second ratio (see diagrams 1 and 2). What are his observations? 
 
You just have to simultaneously consider the two curves to determine, without a doubt, the 
whole synchronism of their movements. In general the unemployment index varies along with 
the wage/price ratio except at some points (Q1 1920 Q1 1924) where changes in the first 
immediately follow the second. (Ibid., 429) 
 
In his second article of 1931, Rueff notes that “a simple glance at the diagram shows 
clearly that what was true from 1919 to 1925 was also true from 1928 to 1931, and with as 
much rigor and precision as in the past” (1931a: 214). In the end, Rueff correlates the 
wage/price ratio and the unemployment rate. This correlation was described by Sir Josiah 
Stamp (1880-1941) – statistician and former director of the Bank of England from 1928 to 
1941 – as particularly significant (95%) in the Financial Times of March 15th 1926. Therefore 
Rueff bases his hypothesis upon the observation of general facts. 
 
2.2 The rational branch: Rueff’s reasoning 
The hypothesis is that unemployment increases as the difference between wages and prices 
also increases. As prices freely fluctuate – excluding some protectionist tendencies whose 
incidence has little to do with the effects of unemployment insurance – questions arise 
concerning sticky wages. Rueff thus wonders whether wages are too high, or more precisely 
why wages does not play their role by stabilizing an economic equilibrium.  
 
There is, thus, a reason to believe that the immediate cause of widespread unemployment […] 
would constitute a failure of wage adjustment to the general price level. In so far as a crisis 
unprecedented in History rages in England, it is that lower prices are only followed by lower 
wages – and that after stabilization at the end of 1921, the percentage increase in wages 
relative to the pre-war remained too high relative to the percentage increase in price. (1925b: 
432-433) 
 
The price mechanism, which guarantees the economic equilibrium, is blocked to the 
extent that labour supply is higher than demand. This occurs because of an imbalance in the 
labour market, where the variable-price is unable to address this deficit adjustment: 
 
The discipline of the trade unions in the first place, is extremely powerful in England, and the 
contract system of collective work, more widespread than elsewhere. The tradition, however, 
would have been insufficient to maintain the resilience of unemployed workers to the 
inevitable movement of wages, if a policy of subsidies to the unemployed, as generous as 
costly to the country, had allowed them to remain unoccupied indefinitely, rather than infringe 
the union instructions. (Ibid., 435-436) 
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So this is due first to the role played by the unions and also by the state, which act to 
impede the stabilizing role of the price mechanism. Here lies the core of Rueff’s reasoning: 
for this observation leads ultimately to the postulation of different types of unemployment 
linked with sticky wages:  
1. The context is characterized by a cyclical decrease in prices higher than wages, 
“hence we see how there can exist in the lowering or increasing of prices an influence able to 
govern the labour market” (Ibid., 435). Rueff here joins the classical tradition regarding the 
interdependence of labour, monetary, goods and financial markets. To this type of 
unemployment is added the movements of labour as “in the month of August 1920, there were 
120,000 unemployed persons in Great Britain, a quite similar figure to the pre-war figure, 
which seemed to respond to the inevitable movement of labour” (1926: 54). These inevitable 
movements of labour, as well as the movements of prices, constitute what Rueff calls 
temporary unemployment. This is defined as unemployment due to lower prices being 
absorbed by an increase in activity through lower wages. 
2. There is an excessive wage compared to any equilibrium value given by the 
performance of work. This constitutes a classic vision of voluntary unemployment. So there 
would be, on Rueff’s account, inactivity traps, as “it is very curious and seemingly contrary to 
all economic laws, that wages could remain stable, while the labour supply also significantly 
exceeded labour demand” (1925b: 435). This type of unemployment is permanent in the light 
of previous developments: it persists since the variables of prices and wages do not freely 
fluctuate.  
Finally, temporary unemployment isn’t a problem in itself as, according to Rueff, the 
wages/prices ratio varies with unemployment itself. This allows a return to equilibrium: there 
is often unemployment in periods of decreasing prices. This unemployment is only temporary, 
as it is absorbed when prices rise on the condition that wages follow the trend. For Rueff, this 
has always been the case. But this wages/prices ratio is now blocked, or more precisely it 
doesn’t vary appropriately: wages don’t decrease quickly enough, thus establishing 
permanent unemployment. The problem here is not low wages: 
 
From now, regarding wages the level wouldn’t be one that would ensure the employment of 
all the available labour force – given the volumes of existing capital – but the resulting level 
from the rate of unemployment insurance, itself determined by social rather than economic 
considerations. Thus, in England the level of wages is found strictly immobilized. (1931c: 
871) 
 
Here he is targeting the first type of unemployment noted above. In other words, the 
disappointments of British economic policy are due to the fact that the lawmakers are taking 
into consideration factors that are not purely economic. They are dealing with social 
considerations that are not relevant to the problems they are seeking to tackle. Political 
economy should only deal with economic facts, whereas the British government is confusing 
economic and social views. This is the heart of the problem, as it prevents market regulation 
of prices and so gives birth to inactivity traps. We should also notice that unemployment is 
not the only problem here, as “the Bank of England has consistently tried for two years to 
avoid the higher interest rates that would rather result from the deficit in the balance of 
payments” (Ibid., 873). 
Rueff takes the opportunity in his article of 1931 to attack the work of the ILO 
(International Labour Office), an institution which he thinks has not seen this mismatch: its 
analysis takes the level of prices to be the sole cause of unemployment (see Annex II of Rueff 
1931a: 247-251, entitled Notes relatives aux vérifications expérimentales présentées par le 
Bureau International du Travail dans son étude sur “Les fluctuations monétaires et le 
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chômage”). In addition, in the ILO’s analysis of the causes of unemployment, it fails to deal 
with what restrains wages – an omission noticed by Rueff, who remarks that this report 
“didn’t mention, at least explicitly, measures which tend to immobilize wages” (1931a: 223). 
The ILO isn’t entirely wrong in its analysis, as it is a fact that there is much unemployment as 
a result of lower prices (an equivalent to Rueff’s temporary unemployment), but when prices 
increase, unemployment doesn’t decrease, since the wages/prices ratio continues to increase, 
as Rueff has shown. Indeed, from mid-1923 wages increase simultaneously with a decrease in 
prices. Hence, according to Rueff, the ILO focuses too much on the variable of price and 
obscures the wage/price relationship. If wages are blocked, it is normal that unemployment 
should vary based upon price alone, but the fact remains that it is the lack of wage adjustment 
which is at issue, according to Rueff.  
Regarding possible solutions, Rueff doesn’t consider a decrease in the dole 
(unemployment insurance), but rather advocates higher prices without increasing wages or 
lower wages without a decrease of prices. In order to avoid an impact on the entire global 
market, a depreciation of the British Pound or an increase tariffs appear as good solutions. 
Rueff proposes this second solution in his first article (1925), but only six years later it is no 
longer conceivable for him. This is due in part to the protectionist inclinations of England, but 
is also based on the observation that prices have increased without a concomitant decrease in 
unemployment. 
Hence Rueff have designed tools in order to enlighten social issues such as 
unemployment. We argue that this is based upon his early readings – for instance Poincaré – 
and his interest in non-Euclidean geometry. Indeed, this field of knowledge was in progress 
during his youth. In this respect we aim to present the contributions of non-Euclidean 
geometry that deeply influenced the young Rueff. 
 
2. The non-Euclidean metaphor 
2.1 The contributions of non-Euclidean geometry  
During his youth, Rueff read Science and Hypothesis (1902) and The Value of Science (1905) 
by Henri Poincaré (1854-1912). He also became familiar with the geometry developed by 
Riemann and Lobachevsky. Established for over 2,000 years, Euclidean geometry is still 
taught in schools today, and is based upon five major postulates designed to demonstrate 
various proposals in a three-dimensional space (width, height, depth). Here is the fifth 
postulate: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure n°1 – Euclidean postulate n. 5 (the parallel postulate) 
 
According to this postulate, for any point on a line L, there can pass only one parallel 
line to the given line A. Euclid originally proved it in these terms:  
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And that if a straight-line falling across two (other), straight-lines makes internal angles on the 
same side (of itself whose sum is) less than two right-angles, then the two (other) straight-
lines, being produced to infinity, meet on that side (of the original straight-line) that the (sum 
of the internal angles) is less than two right-angles (and do not meet on the other side). (2007: 
7) 
 
During the eighteenth century, brilliant thinkers built a new geometry upon the 
rejection of this postulate. Although Lobachevsky, Riemann and Bolyai are most often 
mentioned in connection with the development of a geometry which dispenses with the fifth 
postulate, it was Gauss who first succeeded in opening the way to non-Euclidean geometry. 
His results were not published immediately, as they formed part of his correspondence with 
Heinrich Christian Schumacher (1757-1830) in the 1820s. Being exceptionally difficult to 
understand, the works of Lobachevsky and Bolyai in the years 1830-1840 remained widely 
unnoticed. Proper acknowledgment had to wait for more than 20 years, with the publication of 
the correspondence between Gauss and Schumacher and the translation of Bolyai and 
Lobachevsky’s books into several languages.  
Non-Euclidean geometry went through a significant process of development, with 
results provided first in a four-dimensional framework and then for n-dimensions, driven by 
famous authors such as Poincaré. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Sphere of parallel lines passing 
through the same points to the North and 
South 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Representation of parallel lines 
L, Lʹ and Lʹʹ passing through the same 
point 
 
Figure 2 shows two parallel lines A and L from the same point in the North joining the 
same point un the South and, in Figure 3, three lines L, Lʹ and Lʹʹ parallel to a single fourth 
line A, where all these three lines pass through the same point. In both cases the fifth 
postulate from Euclid is not respected. Thus the non-Euclidean geometries were born. 
This intellectual development in geometry coincided with related scientific 
developments in other areas of knowledge. This is particularly the case in physics, which in 
the early 1920s saw the work of Albert Einstein, Marcel Grossman (1878-1936) and David 
Hilbert (1862-1943), based upon that of James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879). These 
developments particularly concerned the move from the Galilean relativity principle, to the 
theories of special and general relativity. The theory of general relativity arose as a relativistic 
theory of gravitation, supplanting the theory of gravitation developed by Isaac Newton (1642-
1727). Much the same applies regarding research by physicists such as Niels Bohr (1885-
1962), Max Planck (1858-1947) and Erwin Schrödinger (1887-1961) during the first third of 
the twentieth century, all of whom questioned postulates from classical mechanics in the 
process of developing what would become quantum mechanics. 
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These intellectual movements in physics are not, in itself, due to geometry, but we 
should note that the theory of general relativity by Einstein would have been impossible 
without the use of the differential geometry of Marcel Grossman (including work by 
Riemann). It would be better, then, to speak about the influence of geometry in physics – and 
in the same way, we may see it as having an influence in political economy (see the intense 
debate between John S. Mill (1806-1873) and William S. Jevons (1835-1882)). Hence, we 
may conclude, such inter-relationships in sciences were numerous at this time, and 
exceedingly fruitful. Rueff became one of the first French economists to adopt a relativist 
position and rank each theory according to this geometrical dichotomy4:  
 
As this ultimate reality is not given, we create it by enunciating a certain number of axioms 
and definitions which we make the premises of reasoning for deducing the empirical laws. 
Extending the theory thus constructed, we derive there from new laws which observation 
may either confirm or invalidate. In the first case, the logical theory remains true. We say 
that the created causes are also true and that the theory derived from them is a Euclidean 
theory. When the coincidence of the consequences with observed laws does not take place, 
the theory remains logical but it is no longer true. We say that it is a non-Euclidean theory. 
(1929 [1922]: 106) 
 
Indeed Rueff only focuses on statistical relations between tools he designed. Rueff 
built his tools on elements that can be discussed but he was only interested in the interactions 
between these variables. That is why Rueff based his analysis on wholesale prices. Only 
accounts the movement of these prices compared with other variables such as the 
unemployment rate. Only accounts the link between all these variables. Here stands a 
conception of science and tools which is deeply influenced by advances in non-Euclidean 
geometry. Indeed it provides the idea that reality, the concrete observation of facts, is not 
essential anymore to produce knowledge. Hence this kind of geometry is not a priori visible 
in our plan. However, knowledge are produced and recognized by the scientific community. 
Then, the imperative of positive observation is no longer relevant in Rueff’s views as it paves 
the way to a conception of reality as inaccessible. Hence “the confirmation of the fact, that 
real space is nothing more than a coherent system of definitions making the interpretations of 
observed appearances possible, is found in the existence of non-Euclidean geometries” (1929 
[1922]: 32). This is upon this basis that Rueff builds its statistical tools. Then we shall analyse 
its conception of reality in order to better understand the scope of this approach. 
  
 
2.2 The reasoning machine and rational ego 
Rueff (1929 [1922]) allows that sciences can be divided into an empirical and a rational 
branch: the former collects facts, while the latter reasons on the basis of these facts in order to 
provide knowledge. Based on this division of labour, the sciences work together by observing 
the succession of facts and designing laws based upon these successions. The concept of 
science as it appears in Rueff’s work is based on the intellectual approach known as 
constructivism. Inspired by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), constructivism is the view that our 
picture of reality is not reality itself. Rueff holds that the human mind (the rational ego) 
builds up the sciences with the help of a specific set of tools (the reasoning machine) 
consisting of syntax, formal logic and mathematical analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Interestingly, Keynes uses the same dichotomy to show that his General Theory is a non-
Euclidean one (1936: 16).  
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Rueff bases his constructivist view of science upon two principles of human reason: 
identity and causality. The human mind cannot reason outside of these two principles, which 
are given a priori and ensure the good conduct of any reasoning. As an affirmation of the 
relationship between two things using the copula “is” (as in “A is B”), the principle of identity 
lies at the basis of deductive reasoning and mathematical induction. On the other hand, 
causality is based upon induction, and links things together in the way which governs the 
succession – or the concatenation, as Rueff put it – of external realities. Hence, in all being 
constructed in the same way by this reasoning machine, the sciences only differ according to 
their object:  
 
We in nowise distinguish the mathematical sciences from the physical or natural, nor the 
social sciences. We claim that all sciences are of the same type, each comprising an 
experimental or observational branch which gleans the facts and extracts therefrom empirical 
laws, and a rational branch which “creates the cause.”(1929 [1922]: 22) 
 
The principle of identity allows for observation and deductive reasoning. It is the 
principle of the justification of mathematical science, paving the way to aggregative rules 
such as “what is true of the group is true of each individual component thereof” (Ibid., 6). 
When a thing is dependent on a theory, then, by syllogism, the facts of the same type depend 
on this theory: the human mind observes that an individual A is a man; he refers to the theory 
“all men are mortal” and concludes that the individual A is mortal. There is no real 
knowledge produced here, because our mind is only comparing a fact with a given theory. 
Here, then, stands the necessity of the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, these two 
principles underlie the rational and empirical branches of science. The first, necessarily 
subsequent to the second, is related to the creation of the causes, while the second concerns 
any given collection of facts that it aims to express under the form of laws. 
Before submitting our thought to the principle of causality, it is necessary to formulate 
this thought by using syntax. Indeed, without using syntax our thought remains free-form and 
personal. In order to communicate ideas to others, a medium of exchange is necessary; it is 
this which gives rise to words, phrases and syntax in order to make the interchange of ideas 
possible. A thought, on this account, is expressed by a proposal that comprises a judgment 
submitted to the reasoning machine. Each proposal has to be very simple, and its content 
should appear immediately so as to ensure that it is free from internal contradictions. This 
principle of non-contradiction only applies to thought and not to syntax, while the latter only 
concerns the shape of the thought and not its substance. And a thought that does not obey this 
principle is not a human thought at all, as “it is a fact that only those judgements are ‘human’ 
which contain no contradiction [...] for beings such as ourselves, a contradictory judgment is 
inconceivable” (Ibid., 10-11).  
In so far as there are false propositions, for instance, that “the Sun revolves around the 
Earth”, this is due to the large number of characteristics in words that are not explicit. Based 
on the proposal that “a definition is a creative proposition which attaches certain 
characteristics to a word and by this fact gives it its existence” (Ibid., 13), Rueff argues that 
the definitions of “Sun”, “Moon” and “Earth” are lacking characteristics such as 
heliocentrism, gravity, centrifugal force and other facts relevant to their interaction. This is 
why we should take care to keep propositions clear, especially in case of complex judgments. 
In fact, if a judgment is not compatible with the principle of causality, this is only due to a 
lack of clarity in our vocabulary. 
Here stands the need for a method which enables us to link propositions so that they 
remain free from contradictions, in such a way as to deliver more complex reasoning. For 
instance, the reasoning in terms of mass exerting a force that makes a trajectory curved (in the 
case of gravitation) is certainly a complex judgment, but this is based upon demonstrated and 
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observed principles. These constitute the axioms, “a priori judgments which we are free 
either to accept or reject” (Ibid., 12). In this respect, axioms enable us to discover new 
scientific laws: the reasoning machine as a relentless spiral of formal logic starts from two 
coherent propositions in such a way as to reach a third. Rueff states that this spiral creates 
nothing in itself, but only reveals reality, which nevertheless remains fundamentally unknown 
– inaccessible – to the human mind. Indeed, “nothing but a new definition or axiom, 
incorporated into a new system – i.e., united with a series of propositions already admitted or 
established, can create new mathematical ‘facts’ which then need only to be rendered 
‘explicit’” (Ibid., 14). Once the reasoning is seen as a relentless spiral, it is upstream that we 
need to bring in new raw material. Rueff accordingly develops a method “which doesn’t focus 
on the object itself, nor on the characteristics of the studied discipline, but rather on its 
linguistic formulation (Claassen 1967: 38). 
The human mind can only work with tools, which are conventions such as methods of 
measurement or the axioms we have affirmed. In this, by referring to the principle of identity, 
the aim is to “render intelligible the system of our ever-changing sensations” (1929 [1922]: 
7), but it follows that the human mind is what really creates connections of causation. For 
instance, gravity is only the cause that creates the following effects: the “Moon revolves 
around the Earth,” and “the Earth revolves around the Sun”. Therefore “the Law of Causality, 
which seems to be the expression of physical reality independent of ourselves, owes its 
existence merely to the effort of our mind to impose that law upon the world” (Ibid., 10). 
Hence the human mind is not passive, as it apprehends, through this principle of causality, a 
constant succession of appearances. Prior to the rational branch, the empirical one observes 
sequences of appearances that are generalized into laws of succession: but this doesn’t 
concern the law of causality, as causes are entirely created by the needs of the human spirit to 
conform human thought to an appearance of reality: 
 
The role of the human mind is not purely passive in the observation of the laws constituting 
the empirical branch of science. Man does more than merely record appearances. He 
determines them to a great extent [...] To say that the empirical laws of our world have 
existence in themselves is an affirmation without any meaning. (Ibid., 39) 
 
Thus, according to the early Rueff, all science creates causes in order to find, via 
deduction, laws that connect sensory experiences. These views on science are explained by 
the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry. This profoundly influenced his reasoning on 
science in general and on political economy in particular. Thus, Rueff defines his variables 
(unemployment, price, wage) and tries to combine them in order to set out his reasoning. This 
paves the way to political economy becoming seen as a statistical science (which is the title of 
his article of 1925a, see also 1961 [1929]). Here we clearly see the links with geometry, as 
Rueff only deals with the relation between variables and looks for a succession of facts. More 
precisely, in his work it is possible to identify some elements which prefigure econometrics. 
Indeed, his work is based upon a permanent relationship between the level of unemployment 
and wage/price ratio, i.e. a correlation, one of the main purposes of the econometric field. A 
correlation – a term drawn from biology – would be defined as the intensity in the statistical 
sense of a link between variables, or numerical statistics, and this is exactly what provides the 
basis of Rueff’s analysis. Obviously, Rueff is still far from the linear regression models and 
other affine relations that would emerge in future decades, but we must admit that here lie the 
roots of econometrics. Moreover, having established this strong correlation, Rueff looks for a 
causal link. Such a link may exist between these variables based upon work by Stamp, 
consisting in a computing the correlation coefficient between the two variables studied:  
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This was a quite exceptional correlation in its permanency, and such a correlation permits an 
affirmation that the two elements under consideration – unemployment and the wage/price 
ratio – were either dependent on one another due to a causal relationship, or were dependent 
on a third factor which would be the common cause of variations. (1931a: 213) 
 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
The study of the relationship between unemployment and the wage/price ratio shows a clear 
succession of facts. Unemployment in England between the two World Wars is due to the 
viscosity of this ratio. This is why Rueff is often seen as a liberal who advocates pay cuts and 
disregards the working classes: but this is a mistake. No matter the level of wage, the sole 
factor which needs to be accounted for is the way wages are determined, which has to be free 
and in perfect accord with the rules of the liberal market. This is based upon a structure of 
reasoning that recalls the axiomatic method of geometry and which demonstrates that there is 
no need to observe the sensible world to practice science.  
The result of these lessons learned from non-Euclidean geometry is that we can study 
variables and economic quantities (unemployment, wages, prices). The sensible world no 
longer has a monopoly on the creation of knowledge. It is possible to study variables and their 
succession, and provide scientific laws upon this basis. 
In the end, the conception of reality as it appears in Rueff’s work is rather sceptical of 
the capacity of the human mind.  Our minds, being unable to access the real, only create 
appearances of reality and not reality itself. Where does the production of knowledge come 
from? How can the human mind formulate any idea? Yet even if reality is inaccessible in 
itself, as Rueff thinks, it is still possible to build knowledge in such a way as to approach it as 
closely as possible. The human mind has access to the products of the interaction between 
thought and its environment, not to the environment itself. In this, language, as well as the 
reasoning machine and rational ego, prove to be indispensable tools.  
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5. Tables 
 
  
Wages 
(1913 
base 
100) 
Variations of 
wages (%) 
Prices 
(1913 
base 
100) 
Variations of 
prices (%) 
Wage/Pr
ice ratio 
Variations of 
wage/price 
ratio (%) 
Unem- 
ployment 
rate (%) 
Variations 
of unem-
ployment 
rate (pts) 
1919 
1 207 
+33,4 
249 
+30,1 
0.831 
-10,1 
2.7 
-1,6 
2 209 242 0.863 2.2 
3 216 258 0.837 1.9 
4 221 288 0.767 2.9 
1920 
1 231 309 0.747 1.9 
2 250 324 0.771 
+72,1 
1.1 
3 267 314 
-44,6 
0.850 1.7 
+19,2 
4 273 284 0.961 5.0 
1921 
1 276 227 1.251 8.5 
2 268 
-29,5 
201 1.333 20.9 
3 244 190 1.284 16 
-8,8 
4 228 174 1.310 16 
1922 
1 215 162 
-5,6 
1.327 16.5 
2 202 160 1.262 
-19,6 
16.4 
3 189 157 1.203 14.5 
4 178 
+1,1 
156 1.141 14.1 
1923 
1 177 158 1.120 13 
2 177 160 1.106 11.2 
3 174 156 1.115 11.3 
4 173 161 1.014 10.4 
1924 
1 174 166 1.048 
+12,2 
8.3 
2 177 164 1.079 7.2 
3 179 165 1.084 8 
+3,1 
4 179 170 1.052 8.8 
1925 
1 181 169 1.071 9.1 
2 181 160 1.138 10.6 
3 180 157 1.153 11.3 
4 180 153 1.176 11.1 
 
 
Table n. 1: Variations of prices, wages, wage/price ratio, and unemployment rate. Figures 
from Rueff (1925b). 
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Diagram n. 1: “Les variations du chômage en Angleterre (1919-1925)” in Rueff, 1925b: 431. 
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Diagram n. 2: Untitled diagram from the article published anonymously by Rueff in Rueff, 
1931b: 301. 
 
 
